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Comments
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-THE FULL SERVICE
BANK THAT WAS: BANK CASHIER ENJOINED FROM
PREPARING REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES TO
SECURE BANK LOANS
To the uninitiated, law and the legal profession have long been
somewhat akin to the world Alice confronted when she stepped through
the Looking Glass. Words often have a meaning quite detached from
their generally accepted usage with definitions notoriously short-
lived and subject to modification as the law adjusts to meet changes
in the social and economic order. Nowhere is this more apparent or
of greater potential danger to the bar and our system of justice than in
the field of unauthorized practice of law. As courts alter accepted
definitions of the "practice of law" or extend old principles to cover
new applications, the bar is assailed by accusations of self-serving
and monopoly-building by those whose activities have been enjoined.
The danger arises when the public, for whose ultimate protection
these laws exist, comes to view the courts as arbitrarily interpreting
the law for the benefit of the legal profession. The guiding principle,
the sine qua non of this equation, must be the protection of the public
and the legal order. To accomplish this end, we need clearly de-
lineated boundaries specifying precisely what is and is not the practice
of law together with reasons justifying the categorization.
CONCEPT OF UNAITHOIZED PRACrICE
The concept of unauthorized practice of law arose as a counterpart
to the existence of an organized bar.1 The practice of law became
"authorized" as the privilege to appear before the courts was granted
to a limited few to counter widespread evils which resulted from the
unqualified practice of law.
2
I Vom Baur, Unauthorized Practice, Corporations, and Ethics, 25 UNAU-
THoRZED PRACTICE NEWS 125 (1959).2 Note, Conveyancing-The Roles of the Real Estate Broker and the Lawyer in
Ordinary Real Estate Transactions-Wherein Lies the Public Interest, 19 DEPAu.
L. REv. 319 (1969). See also Vom Baur, What You Should Know About the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 4 TBt, SUENT LAwmyI 20 (Oct. 1958).
In England, the practice of law began to develop in 1178 when
Henry II created a central court and appointed five clerks to serve
as justices in litigation.3 By 1292, however, because of:
[A] condition, intolerable to the king's people, [that grew] up by
the promiscuous practice around the king's courts of persons
unskilled in the law. . . . . Edward I was forced to limit the
practitioners, and in so doing, vested in the Court of Common
Pleas the power to appoint 'attomies and lawyers of the best and
most apt for their learning and skill, who might do service to his
court and people; that those so chosen only, and no others' should
practice.
4
The bar arose, therefore, from the need to protect the public from
the abuses of unqualified legal representation. The courts were
charged with the responsibility of establishing and maintaining mini-
mum standards and excluding those persons unqualified, and hence
"unauthorized" to practice. Similar statutes were enacted in 14025
and 1454.6 These statutes, designed to protect the public, effectively
conferred upon the bar a legal monopoly which has been the basic
source of criticism of subsequent efforts to enjoin unauthorized
practice by laymen and lay agencies. Critics point out that those
who determine what is authorized have too great a personal stake
in the determination-a charge that has, on occasion, contained more
than a shadow of truth.7 However, this monopoly was conferred,
not to enhance the interests of the legal profession, but rather to
3 1 F. POLLACK & F. MArrLAND, THE ISTORY OF ENGLisH LAW 133 (1st ed.
1895).
4 Id. at 194.
5 An Act for the Punishment of an Attorney Found in Default, 4 Hen. IV, ch.
18 (1402). See F. POLLACK & F. MAmni-AN, supra note 3, at 194. This statute
provided that all attorneys should be examined by the justices, and at their discre-
tion only those found to be good and virtuous, and of good fame, learned and
sworn to do their duty be allowed to be put upon the roll and all others be "put
out."
6 See W. HERBERT, ANTIQurry OF THE INNs OF CouRTs AND CHANCERY 167
coLlewellyn, The Bar's Trouble, and oultices-And Cures?, 5 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 104 (1938). The author asserts that the bar has defaulted in its
obligation to provide legal services with the speed and efficiency conmmensurate
with the nleeds of modern society, characterizing the bar as operating in "horse
and buggy" fashion in a superhighway world. Corporations have stepped in to
fill the vacuum with mass-produced form contracts for routine legal workc at a cost
far below that charged by the bar. Llewellyn characterizes some attempts to
prosecute unauthorized practice as efforts to regain the business without curing
the underlying reasons for its flight. He proposes a reorganization of the bar to
insure qualifed, universally available legal counsel to the public at a reasonable
cost by adopting the efficiency techniques of industry and through intra-bar
cooperation.
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protect the public by limiting the practice of law to persons of
ability and character who were subject to judicial supervision.'
The legal profession in this country was founded by lawyers who
had been trained in the common law of England. Dean Pound points
out that in Colonial times because of Puritan hostility to English
lawyers, lack of printed information regarding English law, the
supremacy of the clergy in the colonies, and interference by royal
governors, there were four stages in the early development of the
profession: (1) the attempt to get along without lawyers, (2) the
stage of irresponsible filling out of writs by court officials and petti-
foggers, (3) the era of admitted practitioners in permanent judicial
organizations, and (4) the era of trained lawyers-the bar on the
eve of the Revolution. 9 The period between the Revolution and
the Civil War was crucial to the development of the legal profession
in this country. Economic and political considerations created hostility
toward the English law and caused the public to view with suspicion
privileges granted to any special class. The monopoly conferred upon
the bar came to be viewed as "undemocratic" and was seen merely
as a means of safeguarding a private, money-making occupation.10
The effect of this attitude was to "deprofessionalize" the practice of
law as legislation was enacted in many states to permit any person
of "good moral character" to practice law.1' Throughout this period,
the bar remained unorganized and complacent.12 Then, around 1913,
8 Beach Abstract & Guaranty Co. v. Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark.
1959); State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 373
U.S. 379 (1963), decree modified, 159 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1963); Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 131 (IMI. App. 1964), modified on other
grounds, 214 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966); Hoffmeister v. Tod, 349 S.W.2d 5 (Mo.
1961); New Jersey State Bar Assn v. N. NJ. Mortgage Associates, 161 A.2d 257
(N.J. 1960), modified in part, 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. State Bar, 326 P.2d 408 (Nev. 1958); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109
S.E.2d 402 (W. Va. 1959).
9 E. PouND, TnE LAwym FRoM ANTQUrrY TO MODEMN Tnvms 135-63 (1953).
10 Representative of this attitude is the statement of the Indiana Supreme
Court in 1893:
Whatever the objections of the Common Law of England, there is a law
higher in this country, and better suited to the rights and liberties of
American citizens, that law which accords to every citizen the natural
right to gain livelihood by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts,
sciences, the professions, or other vocations.
In re Leach, 34 N.E. 641, 642 (Ind. 1893).
11The effects of this general attitude are noted by Pound, who states:
[T]he harm that this deprofessionalizing of the practice of law did to the
law, to legal procedure, to the ethics of practice and to forensic conduct
has outlived the era in which it took place and still presents problems to
the promoters of more effective administration of justice.
E. PouNn, supra note 9, at 232.
12 See Wigmore, The Spark That Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J.
Am. Jun. Sody 176 (1937).
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lawyers became increasingly apprehensive over the "unauthorized
practice" situation as corporations began to usurp many of the
lawyers' traditional functions. 13 This led to scattered, sporadic activi-
ties on a local level, primarily centered in New York, to prevent
specific instances of unauthorized practice. In 1930, the American
Bar Association appointed a Special Committee on Unauthorized
Practice which became permanent in 1983. This Committee became
and remains today the directing force behind the campaign against
unauthorized practice. 14
Coexistent with the drive to prohibit unauthorized practice of
law, there began a revival of the professional nature of the practice
of law. Emphasis was increasingly placed upon the responsibilities
of the legal profession to the administration of justice in a spirit of
public service with the earning of a livelihood deemed "incidental."
Justice Cardozo observed: "[One is] received into that ancient fellow-
ship [the bar] for something more than private gain. [The lawyer
becomes] an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice."15 As the concept of public
service returned to the legal profession, the courts resumed the role
begun in 1292, assuming the responsibility of determining qualifications
and imposing discipline upon those members of the profession who
violated this spirit of public service as embodied in the Canons of
Ethics. As public service became paramount to the profession, efforts
to combat the unauthorized practice of law, both within and without
the bar, became imperative. In the words of Samuel Tilden, speaking
to a group which that night became the Association of the Bar of
New York City in an effort to correct the appalling conditions which
prevailed throughout the legal system, "[T]he Bar, if it is to continue
to exist-if it would restore itself to the dignity and honor which it
once possessed-must be bold in defense, and, if need be, bold in
aggression."' 6 In attempting to cope with the continuing problem
13 Bristol, The Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALE L.J. 590 (1913).
14 The creation of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law resulted
in a flurry of legal action in the 1930's against a variety of offenders. The extent
and effectiveness of this activity can be judged from a perusal of G. BRAND, UN-
AUTHOruZED PRAcICE DEcisioNs (1937), a compilation of virtually every case in
the field, some of which are unreported elsewhere. All the decisions prior to 1930
are reported in the first 98 pages whereas the rest of the 838 pages contains cases
between 1930-1937. The Committee publishes UNAUTHORIZED PRAcnTcE NEws, a
quarterly, which reports the latest decisions and activities in the field and often
files amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the ABA in proceedings it considers par-
ticularly significant. These briefs are kept on file and are available to the prac-
titioner upon request.
'5 Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928). See also
E. PoUND, supra note 9, at 6, 10.
10 Reported by Vom Baur, supra note 1, at 131.
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of the unauthorized practice of law, the bar sought to inform the public
of the dangers inherent in condoning such practice and to develop
coercive remedies to alleviate the problem.17
PowEm OF Tm COUNTS TO PREVENT UPL
The courts have, with rare exceptions, 8 held that the judiciary has
absolute control over the licensing and disciplining of attorneys. 19
This plenary power is derived from either, or both, of two sources:
the doctrine of inhereiit power of the common law judiciary20 and
17 Note, Remedies Available to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 62
CoLrm. L. BMv. 501 (1962). See also Adler, The Bar's Campaign Against Unau-
thorized Practice, 11 Aiuc. L. REv. 320 (1957); Maxwell, Techniques in Preventing
the Unauthorized Practice of the Law-The National Standards and Methods, 31
IowA L. R1v. 301 (1946); Resh, Safeguarding the Administration of Justice from
Illegal Practice, 42 MARQ. L. RE:V. 484 (1959); Sanders, Procedures for the Punish-
ment or Suppression of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 5 LAW & CorEMIP. PROB.
135 (1938); Note, The Bar and Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Survey, 26 IND.
L.J. 558 (1951).
'8 Maryland, New York, North Carolina and Vermont recognize legislative
supremacy regarding admissions. See Bastian v. Watkins, 187 A.2d 304 (Md.
1963); In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860); In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E.
635 (N.C. 1906); Bolton v. Day, 132 S.E.2d 292 (Va. 1963). Additionally, in
some jurisdictions regulation of the practice of law is a legislative matter and
the judiciary's power over the bar is limited to that expressly granted by statute.
See In re McKenna, 16 Cal.2d 610, 107 P.2d 258 (1940); Ex parte Ross, 26 S.E.2d
880 (Ga. 1943); In re Bercu, 262 App. Div. 56, 27 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1st Dept. 1948),
aff'd without opinion, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949); North Carolina ex rel.
Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, 184 S.E. 540 (N.C. 1936). In most of these
jurisdictions, the legislative power is delegated to the judiciary but the question of
ultimate control becomes significant in respect to whether, in the absence of
statute, courts may punish unauthorized practice with contempt. See generally
Payne, Title Insurance, The Legislatures and the Constitution, 21 Ar.. L. REv. 25
(1968); Note, 62 CoLur. L. REv. 501, supra note 17.
19 See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz.
1961), modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); Heiberger v. Clark,
169 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1961); People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Assn v. People's Stock
Yards Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (Ill. 1931); Kentucky State Bar Assn v. Holland, 411
S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1967); In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935);
Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); In re Integration of Nebraska State
Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265 (Neb. 1937); In re Baker, 85 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1951); West
Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1959).
20 This inherent power concept is generally supported on the basis of two
theories. First, the courts were forced to undertake numerous powers ancillary to
their adjudicative function (i.e., regulation procedure, providing for judicial per-
sonnel, enforcing decrees, etc.) so as to "fill a legal vacuum" caused by the non-
assertion of regulatory power vested in Parliament but unexercised by that body.
Once this power had been exercised over a period of time, as in the case of
admissions to practice, the courts then relied on "immemorial custom" to sustain
its continued exercise. This view stresses that such inherent power grew out of
necessity. The second theory traces the origin of inherent power to express grants
of authority beginning with the 1292 statute enacted by Edward I. See note 4
supra and accompanying text. This and subsequent grants reaffirmed the premise
that ultimate control over admissions rested in the judiciary. Therefore, because
of necessity, "immemorial custom", express grants and reaffirmation, the judiciary
came to have inherent power over admissions to practice. Payne, supra note 18.
See also Cheadle, Inherent Power of the Judiciary Over Admittance to the Bar,
7 WAsH. L. REv. 233 (1932).
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the doctrine of separation of powers.21 The rationale for the exercise
of this exclusive power was commented upon by the Illinois Supreme
Court in In re Day:
22
That power [to pass upon learning and fitness to practice law]
belongs to the court by virtue of its being a court of justice, and
one of the departments of state into which, under the constitution,
the power falls. Without such power by which the courts can
protect themselves against ignorance and want of skill, they can-
not properly administer justice.
Having asserted their inherent power to license and discipline at-
torneys, the courts inferred, as a corollary to that power, the power to
prevent unauthorized practice,23 usually by injunction 24 or contempt
proceeding.2 5 The rationale behind this extension of power to the
21 The doctrine of separation of powers is used to assert plenary power over
admissions as derived from the grant of the whole judicial power to the judicial
department. The doctrine provides:
[A]ll the powers entrusted to government, whether state or national, are
divided into three grand departments, the executive, the legislative and
judicial. . . . [T]he functions appropriate to each of these branches of
government shall be vested in a separate body of public servants....
[Whomever is] entrusted with power in any one of these branches shall
not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others....
[E]ach shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the
powers appropriate to its department and no other. Kilbourne v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880).
See Lee, The Constitutional Power of the Courts Over Admission to the Bar, 13
HAiv. L. REv. 233 (1924); Payne, supra note 18.
22 54 N.E. 646, 652 (IM. 1899).
23 See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998
(Col. 1957); Connecticut State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140
A.2d 863 (Conn. 1958); People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (Ill. 1931); Bump v. District Court, 5 N.W.2d 914
(Iowa 1942); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 782 (Ky.
1965); In re Opinion of the Justices, 180 N.E. 725 (Mass. 1932); Gardner v. Con-
way, 48 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 1951); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service
Ass'n, 179 A. 725 (R.I. 1935); In re Morse, 126 A. 550 (Vt. 1924); Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619 (Wash. 1953).",4 See, e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz.
1961), modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); State Bar Assn v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863 (Conn. 1958); People ex rel. Ill.
State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (Ill. 1931); Bump
v. District Court, 5 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 1942); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 893 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1965); Lowell Bar Assn v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27
(Mass. 1943); Fitchette v. Taylor, 254 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1934); Hulse v. Criger,
247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. N. N.J. Mortgage
Associates, 123 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1956), 150 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super. 1959), 169 A.2d
150 (N.J. 1961); Land Title & Abstract Co. v. Dworken, 193 N.E. 650 (Ohio
1934); Childs v. Smeltzer, 171 A. 883 (Pa. 1934); Rhode Island Bar Assn v. Auto-
mobile Service Assn, 179 A. 139 (R.I. 1935); Stewart Abstract Co. v. Judicial
Comm'n, 131 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Commonwealth v. Jones and
Robins, Inc., 41 S.E.2d 720 (Va. 1947); Paul v. Stanley, 12 P.2d 401 (Wash.
1932); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1959).
2-5 See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 1987), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937); People ex reL Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
(Continued on next page)
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prevention of unauthorized practice is contained in the oft-quoted
opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Association v. People's Stock Yards State Bank:26
[Having inherent power to control admissions] it necessarily fol-
lows that this court has the power to enforce its rules and de-
cisions against offenders, even though they have never been
licensed by this court. Of what avail is the power to license in
the absence of the power to prevent one not licensed from prac-
ticing as an attorney? In the absence [of such power] the power
to control admissions would be nugatory.
Similarly, in West Virginia State Bar v. Earley,27 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals said:
It would indeed be an anomaly if the power of the courts to
protect the public from the improper or unlawful practice of law
were limited to licensed attorneys and did not extend or apply to
incompetent and unqualified laymen and lay agencies. Such a
limitation of the power of the courts would reduce the legal
profession to an unskilled vocation, destroy the usefulness of
licensed attorneys as officers of the courts, and substantially impair
and disrupt the orderly and effective administration of justice by
the judicial department of the government; and this the law will not
recognize or permit.
The weight of authority supports this extension of the courts' inherent
power to control and prevent unauthorized practice irrespective of
statutory penalties.
28
In the majority of states, the courts have available to them estab-
lished penalties for the unauthorized practice of law through mis-
demeanor statutes,29 which have been upheld as valid exercises of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (i. 1931); Bump v. District Court, 5 N.W.2d
914 (Iowa 1942); Kentucky State Bar Assn v. Tussey, 476 S.W.2d 177 (Ky.
1972); Kentucky State Bar Assn v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. 1961); Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977 (Mo. 1937); Rhode Island Bar Assn
v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 179 A. 139 (R.I. 1935); In re Welch, 185 A.2d 458
(Vt. 1962). See Sanders, supra note 17, for an analysis of injunction and contempt
proceedings to prevent unauthorized practice and a discussion of the alternative
methods for special application (i.e., quo warranto, declaratory judgments, and
mandamus and prohibition).
26 176 N.E. 901, 906 (Ill. 1931).
27 109 S.E.2d 420, 440 (W. Va. 1959).
28 Note, 19 DEPATL L. REv. 319, supra note 2.
29 ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 31 (1958); ALAsKA STAT. § 08.08.230 (Supp. 1968);
Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-261 (1956); Asuc. STAT. ANN. § 25-207 (1947) (corp.
only); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 51-88 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 454.23 (1965);
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9903 (1936); HA A REv. STAT. § 605-17 (1968); IDAHO
CODE § 3-420 (1948); Ky. REv. STAT. § 30.990 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. AxN. §
(Continued on next page)
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the states' police power 30 Penal sanctions have rarely been invoked,
however, because most unauthorized practice actions involve parties
who were unaware of the illegality of their act. This is particularly
true in the case of business organizations who are otherwise performing
a useful service to the community. Under such circumstances, criminal
prosecution has rarely been thought appropriate.31 Considered merely
as additional remedies, the existence of penal sanctions in no way
restricts the inherent power of the courts to proceed with contempt or
injunction proceedings.
32
PRACTICE OF LAw
It is universally conceded that attempts to define precisely the
"practice of law" so as to prescribe practical limits to the scope of
that activity are doomed.33 As the law reflects changes in society,
so must concepts of the practice of law reflect changes in the lawyers'
role. Early statutes and decisions equated practice of law with
litigation.34 As efforts to prevent unauthorized practice expanded,
courts found it necessary to redefine practice of law to include giving
legal advice and drafting legal instruments.35 Perhaps the most
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
37.213 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 807 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 10,
§ 32 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 221, § 41 (1955); MmN. STAT. ANN. §
481.02(8) (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2332 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.020
(1952); NEB. REv. STAT. § 7-101 (1970); NEv. REv. STAT. § 7.285 (1967); N.H.
REv STAT. ANN. § 311:9 (1966); N.Y. Junicnry LAw §§ 478, 485 (1968); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 84-8 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-01 (1960); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 4705.99 (1954); ORE. REv. STAT. § 9.990 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 1610 (1962); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-27-41 (1956); S.C. CODE § 56-141
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-25 (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54-44 (1972); WAsir. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.48.180 (1961); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.30 (1970).30 See, e.g., In re Mundy, 11 So.2d 398 (La. 1942); Hoffmeister v. Tod, 349
S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1961).31 See Sanders, supra note 17, for a detailed discussion of the difficulties of
applying criminal statutes to prevent unauthorized practice. See also Note, 62
CoLmM. L. REv., supra note 17, at 503, n.12, for the twenty-five cases that have
involved criminal prosecution for unauthorized practice through 1962.
32 See, e.g., Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 197 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1946);
Fitchette v. Taylor, 254 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1934); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto-
mobile Service Assn, 179 A. 139 (R.I. 1935); Paul v. Stanley, 12 P.2d 401 (Wash.
1932); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1959).
33 See, e.g., Bump v. District Court, 5 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 1942); Clark v.
Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977 (Mo. 1937); State ex tel. Johnson v. Childe, 23 N.W.2d
720 (Neb. 1941); Auerbacher v. Wood, 59 A.2d 863 (N.J. Eq. 1948); West
Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1959).
34 See, e.g., Dunlap v. Lebus, 65 S.W. 441 (Ky. 1901).
85 See, e.g., Eley v. Miller, 34 N.E. 836 (Ind. 1893); People ex tel. Ill. State
Bar Ass'n v. People s Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (M11. 1931); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935); In re Duncan, 65 S.E. 210
(S.C. 1909).
1972.]
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
celebrated exposition of what constitutes legal practice is found in
In re Opinion of the Iustices:36
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to any proceeding in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an exten-
sive field of business and trust relations and other affairs .... No
valid distinction can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. The work
of the office lawyer is the groundwork for future possible contests
in courts. It has profound effect on the whole scheme of the
administration of justice. It is performed with that possibility in
mind, and otherwise would hardly be needed.
The criterion thus became the nature of the act performed rather
than the place it was done.a7 In People v. Alfani,2s the court discussed
the importance of extending the practice of law to include work done
outside the court, pointing out that hazards to the public were
reduced to a minimum in court proceedings "where the proceedings
are public and the presiding officer is generally a man of judgment
and experience .... Not so, in the office. Here the client is with his
attorney alone, without the impartial supervision of the judge.
Ignorance and stupidity may here create damage which the courts
of the land cannot undo."39 Note the emphasis on public protection.
The sole justification for excluding from the practice of law persons
not admitted to the bar and for limiting and restricting such practice
to members of the legal profession is not for the protection of the
members of the bar from competition or the creation of a monopoly
for the members of the legal profession, but is instead for the protection
of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters
by unqualified and undisciplined persons over whom the judiciary
can exercise little or no control.
40
36 194 N.E. 313, 317 (Mass. 1935). This same language has been adopted by
other courts. See, e.g., Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ark.
1959); State Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863, 870
(Conn. 1958).
37 See, e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn. 1966); Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941 (MII. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728, re-
hearing denied, 302 U.S. 777 (1937); State v. Butterfield, 111 N.W.2d 543 (Neb.
1961); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919); Stack v. P. G.
Garage, Inc., 80 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1951); Shortz v. Farrell, 193 A. 20 (Pa. 1937);
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619 (Wash.
1953).
38 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
89 Id. at -- , 125 N.E. at 673.
40 West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1959). Accord,
(Continued on next page)
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The judiciary has the inherent and exclusive power to define the
practice of law.41 The legislature cannot restrict or impair this power
of the courts; neither can it authorize laymen or lay agencies to engage
in the practice of law. 42 This allows the courts flexibility to alter their
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
e.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961),
modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); Beach Abstract & Guar. Co. v.
Arkansas Bar Ass'n, 326 S.W.2d 900 (Ark. 1959); State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587
(Fla. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), decree modified, 159
So.2d 229 (Fla. 1963); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson Inc., 203 N.E.2d
131 (Ill. App. 1964), modified on other grounds, 214 N.E.2A 771 (Ill. 1966);
Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1965); Meunier
v. Bemich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936); Hoffmeister v. Tod, 349 S.W.2d 5 (Mo.
1961); State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 268 N.W. 95 (Neb. 1937); New Jersey State
Bar Ass'n v. N. N.J. Mortgage Associates, 123 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1956), 150 A.2d
496 (N.J. Super. 1959), 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961); Auerbacher v. Wood, 59 A.2d
863 (N.J. Eq. 1948); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 326 P.2d 408
(Nev. 1958); State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 5 S.E.2d 181 (S.C. 1939).4 1 E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961),
modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863 (Conn. 1958); Application of Kaufman, 206 P.2d
528 (Idaho 1949); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 131
(Ill. App. 1964), modified on other grounds, 214 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966); Bump v.
District Court, 5 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 1942); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank &
Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1965); Kentucky State Bar Assn v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961); Meniner v. Bernich, 170 So. 567
(La. App. 1936); In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935);
Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. N.
N.J. Mortgage Associates, 123 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1956), 150 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super.
1959), 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961); Richmond Assn of Credit Men v. Bar Assn,
189 S.E. 153 (Va. 1937); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 109 S.E.2d 420
(W. Va. 1959). Contra, In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860); In re Applicants for
for License, 55 S.E. 635 (N.C. 1906).
42 See the cases compiled in note 41, supra. Statutes providing that the
judiciary shall, by general or special rules, regulate admissions of attorneys are
declaratory of power inherent in the judiciary to supervise, regulate and control
generally the practice of law. E.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 8 N.E.2d 941
Il. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937). However, any statute that seeks
to control the judiciary in the performance of its duty to decide who shall
engage in the practice of law is void and without force. See In re Opinion of the
Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935). Contra, cases compiled in note 18, supra.
Statutes that undertake to specify qualifications for admission to the bar are
regarded as fixing the minimum and not as setting bounds beyond which the
judiciary cannot go. E.g., In re Keenan, 47 N.E.2d 12 (Mass. 1943). Similarly,
penal statutes, supra note 29, are seen as an aid to and not a limitation upon the
exercise by the judiciary of its power to regulate the practice of law. E.g., New
Jersey State Bar Assn v. N. N.J. Mortgage Associates, 123 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1956),
150 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super. 1959), 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961). The general theory
underlying judicial-legislative separation is expressed in Creditors Serv. Corp. v.
Cummings, 190 A. 2 (R.I. 1937):
Although the legislature may not subvert the power of the judiciary, yet
it may, in the exercise of the police power, pass laws which are in aid of
the judicial power that it deems necessary or expedient. In the exercise
of this power, the legislature may properly enact a statute designed to
protect the public against imposition, incompetency and dishonesty, but
it has no power to pass a law granting the right to anyone to practice
law. The former type of enactment tends to strengthen the judicial
authority to regulate the practice of law and so assists the courts in
protecting the public against practices that are not tolerated from members
(Continued on next page)
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concept of the practice of law, and hence, the unauthorized practice
of law, and to conform to the needs of a dynamic society and meet
new forms of unauthorized practice.
The primary problem the courts face in preventing unauthorized
practice is largely a result of the need to define the practice of law in
broad, all-encompassing terms. The very broadness of the definition
precludes its application except on a case by case basis. This results
in an absence of concrete guidelines that would allow laymen and lay
agencies to determine exactly what they are allowed to do and breeds
litigation in an effort to clarify boundaries. This has been particularly
evident in cases involving unauthorized practice by corporations.
The rule is well established that a corporation may not practice
law.43  Corporate usurpation of a legal practice had become so
complete that the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank44 noted that the bank "transacted for its customers
and others almost every form of legal business except the handling of
divorce cases." The principle underlying the prohibition of corporate
practice was well expressed in State Bar Association of Connecticut v.
Connecticut Bank and Trust Co.45 where the court stated:
The practice of law is open only to individuals proved to the
satisfaction of the court to possess sufficient general knowledge
and adequate special qualifications as to learning in the law and to
be of good moral character. A dual trust is imposed on attorneys
at law. They must act with fidelity both to the courts and to their
clients. They are bound by canons of ethics which are enforced by
the courts. The relation of an attorney to his client is pre-eminently
confidential. It demands on the part of the attorney undivided
allegiance, a conspicuous degree of faithfulness and disinterested-
ness, absolute integrity and utter renunciation of every personal
advantage conflicting in any way directly or indirectly with the
interest of his client. Only a human being can conform to these
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
of the bar, while the latter is an encroachment upon the judicial power
and invalid because it is in derogation of the inherent and exclusive
prerogative of the court.
43 E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co. 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961),
modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan
and Tyson, Inc., 203 N.E. 131 (I1. App. 1964), modified on other grounds, 214
N.E.2d 771 (IMI. 1966); People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 176 N.E. 901 (IM. 1931); Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,
393 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1965); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961); Kendall v. Beiling, 175 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.
1943); In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313 (Mass. 1935); New Jersey State
Bar Ass'n v. N.N.J. Mortgage Associates, 123 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1956), 150 A.2d 496
(N.J. Super. 1959), 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961); Green v. Huntington Nat'l Bank,
209 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio App. 1964), aff'd, 212 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio 1965); West
Virginia State Bar v. Earley 109 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1959).
,4 176 N.E. 901, 903 (Ill. 1931).
45 140 A.2d 863, 870 (Conn. 1958).
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exacting requirements. Artificial creations such as corporations or
associations cannot meet these prerequisites and therefore can-
not engage in the practice of law.
Theory and application soon part, however, as the courts confront the
problem created by the nebulous nature of "practice of law." The
result has been a line of decisions consistent only in their inconsistency
as the courts have sought to accommodate the need for public pro-
tection through restricting the practice of law to members of the bar
with the economic and practical realities of modem society. As the
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in Cowern v. Nelson:46
The line between what is and what is not the practice of law can-
not be drawn with precision. Lawyers should be the first to recog-
nize that between the two there is a region wherein much of what
lawyers do every day in their practice may also be done by others
without wrongful invasion of the lawyers' field.... It is the duty
of this court so to regulate the practice of law and to restrain such
practice by laymen in a common sense way in order to protect
primarily the interest of the public and not to hamper and burden
such interest with impractical technical restraints no matter how
well supported such restraint may be from the standpoint of pure
logic.
The problem with common sense, of course, is that it depends entirely
upon one's perspective.
Restricting our analysis to the rule that drafting legal instruments
constitutes the practice of law, we find a number of qualifications
resulting from attempts to "draw the line." Based on the argument
that public policy requires convenience in commercial transactions
and that attorneys cannot be present at all times, some courts have
permitted simple drafting that is "incidental" to what is otherwise
lay work,47 whereas others have denied any such limitation upon the
general prohibition against lay practice. 48 The confusion created by
46290 N.W. 795, 797 (Minn. 1940).
47 See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998
(Colo. 1957); Lowell Bar Assn v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27 (Mass. 1943); State Bar v.
Kupris, 116 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1962); Childs v. Smeltzer, 171 A. 883 (Pa. 1934);
Bar Assn v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 326 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. App. 1959);
State v. Dinger, 109 N.W.2d 685 (Wis. 1961); cf. Creekmore v. Izard, 367 S.W.2d
419 (Ark. 1963); Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc., 41 S.E.2d 720 (Va.
1947)8 E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961),
modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); Arkansas Bar Assn v. Block
323 S.W.2d 912 (Ark. 1959); Agran v. Shapiro, 127 Cal. App.2d 807, 273 P.2d
619 (1954); Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn. 1966), appeal
dismissed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Qulan & Tyson, Inc., 203N.E.2d 131 (1ll. App. 1964), modified, 214 N.E.2d 771 (IlI. 1966); Pioneer Title
Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar Ass'n v. N.NJ. Mortgage Associates, 12 A.2d 498
(N.J. 1956), 150 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super. 1959), 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961).
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this conflict has been further complicated by attempts to distinguish
between "simple" instruments, generally printed on forms which the
layman completes by adding information relevant to the particular
transaction, and those which are "complex." Some courts concluded
that the completion of the former does not constitute the practice of
law, generally adding that the forms must have been prepared by an
attorney and that there be no compensation to the layman.49 However,
if any legal judgment is required, either in the selection of the form
or in the solicitation or recording of the information, the act is
prohibited. 50 On the other hand, many courts have entirely rejected
the "simple instrument" rule holding that even the completion of
standard forms is illegal, 51 following the reasoning first espoused by
Judge Pound in his concurring opinion in People v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co.5 2 where he concluded: "I am unable to rest any satisfactory
test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The
most complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble
the inexperienced." Some courts seek to draw the line at compensation.
The payment of separate compensation for the preparation of even
instruments considered "incidental • constitutes the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.53 Courts have also been quick to reject the contention
that services are free when, in fact, they constitute an inducement for
other, compensated work or when the customer is charged a "service
49E.g., In re Matthews, 79 P.2d 535 (Idaho 1938); State v. Indiana Real
Estate Ass'n, 191 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. 1963); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d
27 (Mass. 1943); Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 268 N.W. 719 (N.D.
1936); Goodman v. Beall, 200 N.E. 470 (Ohio 1936); State v. Dinger, 109 N.W.2d
685 (Wis. 1961).5o E.g., People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App.2d 844, 142 P.2d 960 (1943); Grievance
Comm. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339 (Conn. 1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 683
(1967); State Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863 (Conn.
1958); People v. Schafer, 87 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1949); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust
Co. v. State Bar, 326 P.2d 408 (Nev. 1958); Crawford v. McConnell, 49 P.2d 551
(Okla. 1935); Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc., 41 S.E.2d 720 (Va. 1947).
51-E.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 131 (IMI. App.
1964), modified on other grounds, 214 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966); People v. Schaefer,
87 N.E.2d 773 (IMI. 1949); People v. Lawyer Title Corp., 282 N.Y. 513, 27 N.E.2d
30 (1940); Martineau v. Gressner, 182 N.E.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1962); Hexter Title
& Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 179 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1944).
52227 N.Y. 336, 379, 125 N.E. 666, 670 (1919). Accord, Chicago Bar
Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 203 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. 1964), modified on other
grounds, 214 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966); Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788 (Minn.
1951); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. N.N.J. Mortgage Associates, 123 A.2d 498
(N.J. 1956), 150 A.2d 496 (N.J. Super. 1959), 169 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961); Oregon
State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334 (Ore. 1962); Hexter Title &
Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 179 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1944); Washington
State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619 (Wash. 1952).
53 See, e.g., Fink v. Peden, 17 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1938); Bump v. District Court,
5 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 1942); Fitchette v. Taylor, 254 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1934);
Hulse v. Criger, 247 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1952); Cain v. Merchants Natl Bank &
Trust Co., 268 N.W. 719 (N.D. 1936); Haverty Furniture Co. v. Foust, 124 S.W.2d
694 (Tenn. 1939); State ex rel. Junior Ass'n v. Rice, 294 N.W. 550 (Wis. 1940).
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fee" which can be directly linked to the performance of legal services.'
The landmark case in the rejection of the incident-to-business theory
is Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee55 wherein the
court pointed out that, if carried to its logical extreme, "most legal
work... would be performed by corporations and others not licensed
to practice law. The law practice would be hawked about as a leader
or premium to be given as an inducement for business transactions."
Most jurisdictions now reject the incident-to-business theory as per-
mitting layman or lay agencies to draft legal instruments although a
few, while expressly rejecting the theory, continue to allow the practice
due to public policy considerations.
5 6
The other major exception to the rule that drafting instruments
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law is the "substantial interest"
theory. Far more restricted than the incidental-to-work theory, it is
based on the universally accepted rule that any person may represent
himself in "propria persona" in matters wherein his legal rights or
obligations may be substantially affected. As applied to drafting legal
instruments, this exception requires that the person preparing the
document have a "direct interest" in the transaction which is the subject
matter of the document. The mere assertion in the document of con-
tractual rights growing out of the negotiation of the transaction is not
sufficient to make one a party with an interest sufficient to invoke this
exception since his interest is not in the subject matter of the trans-
action but in the fees for his services for bringing it about. The Court
of Appeals of Kentucky enunciated this principle in Carter v. Treva-
than57 wherein it said:
[O]ne, who is not a lawyer, must not only act without considera-
tion for his services in drawing the paper but he must be a party
54 E.g., Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 22 A.2d 389 (Conn. 1966), appeal dis-
missed, 386 U.S. 683 (1967); Rosenthal v. Shepard Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 12
N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1938); State v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 74 S.W.2d 348 (Mo.
1934); New Jersey State Bar Assn v. N.N.J. Mortgage Associates, 123 A.2d 498
SN.J. 1956); People v. Peoples' Trust Co., 180 App. Div. 494, 167 N.Y.S. 767
1917); Cain v. Merchants Natl Bank & Trust Co., 268 N.W. 719 (N.D. 1936);
Green v. Huntington Nat'1 Bank, 209 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio App. 1964), affd 212
N.E.2d 585 (Ohio 1965); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm. 179
S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1944).
55 179 S.W.2d 946, 953 (Tex. 1944).
56 Notable among these is Colorado. In Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, 312 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1957), the court rejected the incidental-to-
work theory but declined to enjoin the preparation of legal instruments by laymen
because it felt that the public interest was best served by allowing the continuance
of a practice that had for many years afforded convenience to the public. The
court noted the scarcity of lawyers in some sections of the state and felt that it
would be more harmful than beneficial to require that all documents be prepared
by attorneys.
57 309 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Ky. 1958).
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to, or his name appear in, the instrument as one to be benefitted
thereby. Merely having a pecuniary interest, direct or indirect, in
the transaction covered by the instrument he draws will not suffice
to relieve of the charge of unauthorized practice of law unless he
is a party to, or his name appears in, the paper as one of the bene-
ficiaries thereof.
This requirement has served to restrict the application of the sub-
stantial interest exception to real parties in interest and insures that
it cannot be used as an entry into the practice of law by laymen
through drafting instruments for others.
The substantial interest exception is generally held to apply to
corporations as well as to individuals insofar as the preparation of
legal instruments is concerned.58 In State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona
Land Title & Trust Company,59 the Arizona Supreme Court said:
As the trial court illustrated, a person or corporation owning
an interest in real estate has an interest in property and may pre-
pare his or its own contracts or other instruments in relation to
that property provided such person or corporation is a party to
such instruments; a person or corporation lending money has an
interest in the transaction and may prepare those documents
necessary in connection with such loan.
Similarly, in Title Guaranty Co. v. Denver Bar Association,60 the
Supreme Court of Colorado held: "It is elementary that a layman or
a corporation may prepare instruments to which he or it is a party
without being guilty of the unauthorized practice of law." It is
fundamental that the acts of agents or employees of a corporation,
acting within the scope of their employment, are the acts of the
corporation itself.6 When they prepare legal documents, the corpora-
tion prepares them. Consequently, as the North Carolina Supreme
Court reasoned in State v. Pledger:62
A person who, in the course of his employment by a corporation,
prepares a legal document in connection with a business transaction
in which the corporation has a primary interest, the corporation
58 E.g., State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1 (Ariz. 1961),
modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962); Title Guar. Co. v. Denver Bar
Ass'n, 312 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1957); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. N.N.J.
Mortgage Associates, 161 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1960), modified in part, 169
A.2d 150 (N.J. 1961); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar, 326 P.2d 408
(Nev. 1958); State v. Pledger, 127 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. 1962).
59 366 P.2d 1, 12 (Ariz. 1961), modified on rehearing, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz.
1962).
60 312 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Colo. 1957).61 E.g., Mack v. Saars, 188 A.2d 863 (Conn. 1963). See also 19 CJ.S.
Corporations §§ 933, 993, 999 (1940).
62 127 S.E.2d 337, 339-40 (N.C. 1962).
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being authorized by law and its charter to transact such business,
does not violate the statute, for his act in so doing is the act of
the corporation in the furtherance of its own business.
To hold otherwise would be to negate the substantial interest excep-
tion as applied to corporations and would require an attorney to draft
any document which gives rise to legal obligations. In this era of
implied warranties, a sales slip gives rise to legal obligations. To im-
pose such a burden upon corporations would seem untenable.
KmUCKY REjEcts SUBSTANTIAL INTMEST
DocmME FOR CORPORATIONS
Against this general overview of the unauthorized practice of law
as applied to the drafting of legal instruments, the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky recently rendered a decision in the case of Kentucky State
Bar Association v. Tussey.63 Mr. Tussey, a lay officer in a rural bank,
had been ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court for the unauthorized practice of law for having prepared nine
real estate mortgages to secure loans made by the bank out of its own
funds to its customers, the mortgagors. 64 It was stipulated that Mr.
Tussey prepared the mortgages for and on behalf of the bank, that the
bank was a party to each of the instruments in a non-fiduciary
capacity (i.e., was a real party in interest) and that neither he nor the
bank received any consideration or remuneration for the preparation
of the real estate mortgages. 65
The Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, has defined the
practice of law in Rule 3.020 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals66
which at the time this proceeding arose read as follows:
'The practice of law' is any service rendered involving legal
knowledge or legal advice, whether of representation, counsel, or
advocacy in or out of court, rendered in respect to the rights,
duties, obligations, liabilities or business relations of one requiring
the service. But nothing herein shall prevent any person not
holding himself out as a practicing attorney from drawing any
63 476 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. 1972).64 Brief for Complainant at 1, Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Tussey, 476 S.W.2d
177 (Ky. 1972).
65 Id. at2.66 Hereinafter cited as RCA. RCA 3.020 was adopted pursuant to Ky. REv.
STAT. § 30.170 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS] which provides that the court
shall adopt and promulgate rules defining the practice of law and prescribe a code
of professional conduct for attorneys and prohibits the adoption of a rule which
prevents a person not holding himself out as an attorney from writing a deed,
mortgage, or will, or prevents a person from drawing any instrument to which
he is a party.
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instrument to which he is a party without consideration unto
himself therefor. (emphasis added).67
The Court has held specifically that the drawing of mortgages con-
stitutes the practice of law.68 Thus, Mr. Tussey is guilty of the unau-
thorized practice of law unless he comes within the "substantial
interest" exception of RCA 3.020. This depends, in turn, upon whether
a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of RCA 3.020. For, if
the corporation is a "person" and the acts of an employee, acting within
the scope of his employment, are the acts of the corporation, then
Mr. Tussey's preparation of the mortgages was the corporation's prepa-
ration of the mortgages and would be permitted under the substantial
interest exception for it is stipulated that the bank was a real party
in interest. On the other hand, if a corporation is not a "person" within
the context of RCA 3.020, then neither the bank nor, by derivation,
Mr. Tussey fall within the exception and both would be guilty of the
unauthorized practice of law. This situation is not expressly covered
by the Rules of the Court.
The precedent is clearly established in Kentucky, as elsewhere, that
a corporation may not practice law, even where it employs attorneys to
perform the acts which constitute the practice of law.69 Thus, it is
clear that the bank could not prepare mortgages, even through attor-
neys, with or without compensation, directly or indirectly, to secure a
loan agreement between third parties. However, if the corporation falls
within the substantial interest exception its preparation of mortgages
does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
7 0
A somewhat similar situation had been presented to the Court in
Carter v. Trevathan.71 There, a bank officer was charged with the
unauthorized practice of law for preparing, without consideration, four
67 RCA was subsequently amended to read: "But nothing herein shall prevent
any natural person not holding himself out as a practicing attorney from drawing
any instrument to which he is a party without consideration into himself therefor."
RCA 3.020 (1970).6 Howton v. Morrow, 106 S.W.2d 81 (Ky. 1937). "Practicing law is not
confined to performing services in actions or proceedings in courts of justice, but
includes giving advice and preparing wills, contracts, deeds, mortgages and other
instruments of a legal nature." Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
69 Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965);
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 842 S.W.2d 397 (Iy.
1961); Kendall v. Beiling, 175 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1943); Mut. Bankers Corp. v.
Covington Bros. & Co., 125 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1938).
70 It serves little purpose to attempt to decipher whether, when one acts on
his own behalf, the preparation of legal instruments is considered not the practice
of law or rather not the unauthorized practice of law. The result is the same.
To engage in semantical acrobatics obscures the real issue- whether in the public
interest the given act should be allowed in the circumstances indicated.
71309 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1958).
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deeds for customers of the bank. The bank did not own nor did it
acquire any interest in the property covered by the deeds but rather
bad only a pecuniary interest in the transactions which were the
subject matter of the documents. The Court applied the substantial
interest test, found neither Mr. Trevathan nor the bank to be a real
party in interest to the documents, and consequently ruled that Mr.
Trevatban's preparation of the deeds constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. The Court then went on to explain the application of
the substantial interest exception to officers of the corporations which
are real parties in interest:
However, if one, who is not a lawyer, is an officer of a corporation
or a member of a firm or partnership, not acting in a fiduciary
capacity, he may under RCA 3.020, draw a legal instrument for
or on behalf of the corporation, firm or partnership if it is a party
to the instrument, provided he receives no remuneration for that
particular service.72
This language was clearly applicable to Mr. Tussey if still valid. The
Court, however, said it "must give way to the fundamental principle
of Frazed'.a In Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.7 4 the
Court had extended its opinion to include a declaration of policies
specifying precisely those acts a bank was permitted to perform in
the administration of trusts.Th Specifically included was a prohibition
against the preparation of mortgages by a fiduriary in the course of
administering an estate.7 6 In Tussey the Court stated:
721Id. at 748. Accord, Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 197 S.W.2d 454 (Ky.
1946). See also 1956 Op. AT'y GEN. 39, 180, which stated that a bank could,
without consideration therefor, draw any instrument to which it was a party and
this wvould include a mortgage given to the bank to secure a real estate loan.
However, the bank could not draw any deed in which it was not named as either
grantee or grantor.
73 Kentucky State Bar Assn v. Tussey, 476 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1972). The
Court is referring to Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d
778 (Ky. 1965).
74 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965).
7 These policies were incorporated from the Statement of Policies adopted
by a Conference Committee composed of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law of the American Bar Association (see, note 14 supra, and accom-
panying text) and the Executive Committee of the Trust Division of the American
Bankers Association. These conferences are the result of the Unauthorized Practice
Committee's efforts to cooperate with other groups (i.e., realtors, bankers, life in-
surance companies, accountants, etc.) to delineate the boundaries of the unau-
thorized practice of law in the respective fields. This approach is one of the
most effective means of educating the public and curbing unauthorized practice
as it allows the conference groups to eliminate those controversies which breed
misunderstanding and litigation between the bar and the lay or professional group
involved.7 6Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Ky.
1965).
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The reason a trustee cannot do the things prohibited to it under
Frazee is that unless it is a beneficial party to the instrument
drawn, it is not the real party in interest and therefore is drawing
the instrument for someone else who is. This distinction is not
obscured by the close relationship between trustee and bene-
ficiary.77
This, of course, is fundamental to the substantial interest exception.
The excepted party must be a real party in interest. The Court then
goes on to say:
Neither may it be obscured by the relationship between... corpo-
ration and officer. If the nonprofessional trustee may not prepare
an instrument for his or its beneficiary, the nonprofessional officer
or employe may not prepare it for his employer.78
But does the same relationship exist between trustee and beneficiary
as exists between officer and corporation? Are the acts of the trustee
the acts of the beneficiary? Patently not. When the trustee prepares
a mortgage or other instrument for the beneficiary of the trust he is
clearly acting for a third party. On the other hand, the corporate officer,
acting within the scope of his employment, is the corporation. His acts
are the acts of the corporation. The separate identities merge. Not so,
according to the Court.
In the case before us the bank was a party to the mortgages in
question and would have the right to prepare such instruments if
it were physically possible for it to do so. But a corporation is an
artificial person, not capable of performing any act except through
the agency of others, and for that reason it cannot come within
the meaning of a "person" as the word is used in KRS 30.170 (3)
and RCA 3.020.
This proceeding is not against the bank. It is against an in-
dividual, and it is only because the Respondent [i.e., Tussey], as an
individual not authorized to practice law, cannot draw real estate
mortgages for others without being engaged in the practice of law
that in practical effect his corporate principal cannot have them so
drawn for itself. Hence the statement in Trevathan to the contrary
is unsound, and ... it is overruled. (emphasis added).79
We must amend previous conceptions. The acts of a corporate officer,
acting within the scope of his employment, are not the acts of the
corporation; rather, they are the acts of an individual for the corpora-
tion. Thus, the relationship between an officer and his corporation
is the same as that of any third party to the corporation. Therefore,
the substantial interest exception to the unauthorized practice of law
77 Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Tussey, 476 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1972).
78 Id. at 179.
79 Id. at 179.
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is defunct as regards corporations. The ramifications of this change
in the structural relationship between corporation and officer are
mind-boggling when extended beyond this narrow application but
are vastly beyond the scope of this discussion.
Method aside, what are the practical consequences of Tussey inso-
far as the drafting of instruments is concerned? Narrowly construed,
the decision goes no further than holding that "the preparation of
real estate mortgages for a bank by an officer of the bank, whether
it be with or without remuneration from the mortgagee [sic] to the
bank or to the officer, constitutes the practice of law."80 And yet, if the
substantial interest exception no longer operates in favor of corpora-
tions, then the drafting of any legal instrument by a corporate employee
constitutes the practice of law. Carried to its illogical extreme it
could, as noted earlier, require attorneys for the filling out of sales slips.
The prospect of such a result is ludicrous, of course, and was answered
by the Court as follows:
Whether the principle of this case applies to certain other con-
tracts and commercial papers ... is a question we cannot appro-
priately decide here. Suffice it to say, however, that we accept
Holmes' thesis that the life of the law has not been logic, but
experience, and it is not likely that we shall be disposed to ignore
the practical facts of life. (emphasis added).
81
We have no guidance. The implication is that each instrument will be
held up to the light and scrutinized to determine whether the "practical
facts of life" dictate that it be allowed to remain among the corporate
world or whether it may be entrusted only to the legal profession,
What are the critical factors? Complexity? No, the Court rejected any
distinction between simple and complex instruments in Frazee.8
2
Custom? Unlikely. Incident-to-business? Again, rejected.,: Credit
instruments? Doubtful, considering the effect upon commerce. Instru-
ments affecting real property? Probably. It may be that Tussey signals
a campaign by the Court to insure that any instruments affecting
interests in real property be prepared only by an attorney. If so, it
may be viewed as a judicial extension of KRS § 382.83584 which
so Id. at 180-81.
81 Id. at 181.
82 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965).
88 Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 342 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. 1961).
84 KRS 382.335 provides:
(1) No county clerk shall receive, or permit the recording of any instru-
ment by which title to real estate or personal property,or any interest
therein, or lien thereon, is conveyed, granted, encumbered, assigned or(Continued on next page)
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requires that any instrument to be recorded must be signed by the
person who prepared it and which, when combined with the natural
person amendment to RCA 3.02085 which this action implicity tests,
results in the requirement throughout the state that such instruments
be signed by an attorney unless drafted by an individual who was
himself a party to the instrument. Speculation? Completely.
And what is the status of individuals who are allowed to prepare
those documents which the "practical facts of life" require be left with
the corporations? The conclusion is inescapable. Without the sub-
stantial interest exception, the Court will be allowing the lay officers
and employees to practice law "a little bit". And further, without the
exception, what limitation can be placed upon the drafting of such
instruments generally? If the drafting of specified instruments is
considered not the practice of law, then any layman, with or without an
interest, could draft them with impunity, a situation seemingly far
more endemic of the public interest than the situation prior to Tussey.
On the other hand, if such drafting is limited to the officers or em-
ployees of corporations which are "beneficially interested" in the sub-
ject matter of the transaction covered by the document, then we're
back where we started with the substantial interest exception applying
to corporations and, by derivation, their employees, with a few speci-
fied instruments excluded. It would seem far easier and more logically
sound to merely exclude the offending instruments originally.
The criterion for the regulation of the practice of law must be
the public interest. Construed broadly, Tussey provides more pro-
tection than the public can probably stand and, to the degree that it
imposes a net burden on commercial transactions without a cor-
responding increase in needed protection, is actually detrimental to
the public interest. If, on the other hand, Tussey is limited to real
estate mortgages and, by implication, to other instruments affecting
title to real property, the holding provides increased protection in a
complex field which too often finds the property owner unable to
protect himself. It can be said with a degree of confidence that the
average layman involved in a real estate transaction finds himself
engaged in a highly technical procedure about which he is inexperi-
enced; that he dislikes lawyers, or at least lawyers' fees; and that he
is therefore highly receptive to the suggestion that laymen carry out
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
otherwise disposed of; nor receive any instrument, or permit any instru-
ment, provided by law, to be recorded as evidence of title to real estate;
.unless such instrument has endorsed on it, a printed, type-written or
stamped statement showing the name and address of the inividual who
prepared the instrument, and such statement is signed by such individual.
85 See note 67 supra.
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the entire transaction for him, particularly if some of the services are
"fred'. He wants complete security with a minimum of expense and
bother. At the least he should have the formal protection and the
advice and assistance of disinterested and technically qualified legal
counsel.8 6 On the other hand, the mortgagee, concerned with the
business of making loans on favorable terms, is indifferent to the
mortgagor's legal problems, except insofar as his title is sufficient to
secure the loan.87 The elimination of the substantial interest exception
for corporations and their officers and employees would seem too
radical a procedure to provide this extended protection. A prohibition
of the drafting of specifically enumerated legal instruments (i.e., real
estate mortgages, deeds, etc.) by other than licensed attorneys would
provide this protection without the potential strangulation of com-
merce resulting from the abolition of the substantial interest doctrine
and would preclude the mound of litigation which will be necessary
to clarify Tussey as it applies to the myriad documents which affect
"rights, duties, obligations, liabilities or business relations". This
would satisfy our dual requirements of specificity as to what constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law and, since the prohibited instruments
would have to be excluded on the basis of policy considerations
without the blanket rationale provided by the rejection of the sub-
stantial interest doctrine, justification for the categorization. The
excellent and oft-cited opinion of the Court in Frazee is representative
of the direction necessary in unauthorized practice decisions if the
courts and the legal profession are to avoid the appearance of
arbitrariness and monopoly-building, and establish meaningful guide-
lines for laymen and lay agencies. Tussey, unfortunately, represents a
rather significant step backwards.
CoNcLusioN
The sole justification for excluding from the practice of law persons
not admitted to the bar and for limiting and restricting such practice
to members of the legal profession is not for the protection of the
members of the bar from competition or the creation of a monopoly
for the legal profession, but is instead for the protection of the public
from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified
and undisciplined persons over whom the courts have little or no
control. The judiciary has plenary power to define and regulate the
practice of law to that end. Difficulties arise in the application of the
86 Payne, Title Insurance and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Controversy,
53 M-NN. L. RFv. 423, 470 (1969).
87 Id. at 475.
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concept of "practice of law" to specific situations. Necessarily broad,
practice of law too often has meaning only ex post facto. Recognizing
that a region exists wherein the functions of attorney and layman
overlap, the courts seek to regulate the practice of law in a common
sense way so as not to unduly burden the public interest with
impractical technical restraints no matter how sound logically. In the
field of legal instrument drafting the overlap is particularly trouble-
some. One of the few, perhaps the only, valid, workable methods of
defining the boundary which separates the authorized from the
unauthorized has been the "substantial interest doctrine". A fixture
insofar as individuals are concerned, the doctrine is currently defunct
in Kentucky as applied to corporations. Whereas it is conceded that
in a limited application the prohibition against corporate preparation
of legal instruments is sound, the renunciation of the substantial
interest exception creates more and greater problems than it cures.
Maxwell P. Barret, Jr.
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS:
A SOLUTION AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS
Obtaining a judgment or settlement through litigation or nego-
tiation in any legal matter is usually considered a satisfactory con-
clusion to the attorney's efforts; but, if the client is a wife and mother
seeking a decree for child support from her husband, obtaining a
judgment often marks the beginning rather than the end of difficulties.
The wife is faced with the continuing problem of enforcing a child
support decree against a father who has left the state and who refuses
to support his minor children. In spite of legislation designed to
remedy the situation, a husband can still, "by the simple method of
crossing state lines . . . effectively prevent his dependents from
enforcing family support obligations."1 In Hamilton v. Hamilton,
2
the Kentucky Court of Appeals employs an unusual but effective means
of collecting support payments from an affluent husband and father,
living outside the state, who refuses to continue making these pay-
ments in the amount decreed by the Jefferson County Circuit Court.
The opinion of the Court serves both as one solution to the problem
and as a means of underscoring many additional difficulties one may
1 Murphy, Uniform Support Legislation, 43 Ky. L.J. 98, 111 (1954).
2 476 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1972).
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